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1. Introductory remarks
During the last 100 years three penal codes were enacted in Hungary. 
During the time of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the Penai Code of 
1878 was enacted (which, naturaity, had been in force oniy in the terri­
tory of historical Hungary and it was not valid for the territory of the 
Austrian Empire); the second one was enacted in 1961 and the present 
one in 1978. In the following parts when Hungarian positive penal law 
is mentioned we refer to the Penal Code of 1978.
First of all we make a few remarks in connection with the appearance 
of the crimes of omission in Hungarian penal law. True crimes of omission 
(echte Unterlassungsdelikte) appeared already in the penal code of 1878 
but it may be seen, the legislator displayed extreme carefulness concerning 
this category of offence. According to the classical principles of law, true 
crimes of omission —ns Jelfc/a propr/a —were created in the group of 
crimes of office exclusively. These definitions of offence established essen­
tially the responsibility of public officials who recognized in their official 
capacity that persons were arrested lawfully or unlawfully and ommitted 
to perform their official obligations in connection with that (e.g. informing 
higher authorities, relasing unlawfully arrested persons, etc —arts. 
196— 197 PC). It is a trait of both cases that the basis of penalization was 
characterized by the omission of the specific legal obligations prescribed 
for the particular public official. Among the true crimes of omission the 
Penal Code of 1878 mentioned only one case as delfc/M co?n?nMM?'a. According 
to that, a criminal offence is committed by the person who is aware of 
facts or evidence on which the acquittal of an innocent accused or the rele­
ase of a convicted innocent person depends and would not disclose them 
to the competent authority (art. 230). However, it should be emphasized 
that the Penal Code of 1878 prescribed no general obligation of reporting 
the offence to the proper authorities in the case of any criminal offence.
It should be mentioned that one may find a number of definitions 
of criminal offence in the Pena! Code of 1878 that could be regarded as
not true (mixed) crimes of omission (unechte Lnteriassungsdeiikte). 
Sue)) were typicaiiv those offences of resuit (Hrfoigsdeiikte; ti)c so calie(i 
offences of resuit wit it at) open definition of conduct) where the resuit 
couid be produced aiso by omission, e.g. certain varieties of the offences 
against iife ami bodiiy integrity or crimes of office. We have mind, 
in primariiy intentionai offences in certain cases, however, under special 
ruie of the Code, producing the result by negiigence was aiso punishabie. 
This group of the mixed (rimes of omission appeared essentiaiiv it) the 
same reaim even it) later penai coties, for this reason, this group is not to 
be discussed here.
in the first haif of the twentieth century, particuiariv in the era bet­
ween the two wot-id wars a siow increase it) the number of the true crime 
of omission couid he observed as a resuit of the new ideas of penal iaw. 
it was in connection, on the one hand, with the iegisiative intention striving 
for a more intensive protection of pubiic interests and, on the other hand, 
it was reiated to the reguiation of the economy under critninai iaw. As 
the state eontroi over the economy was growing, reguiations of penal iaw woe 
issued and they penaiized the omission of keeping certain records or making 
certain reports. The number of definitions of true offences of omission was not 
significant and their appearance in the judiciai practice was extremeiy 
rare. For exampie, the protection of pubiic health was aimed at bv those 
provisions of penai iaw that penaiized the omission of obligations reiated 
to the registration of drugs enumerated in the international convention 
on opium of i 023. Wc also have te mention that Act 1 [. of i 030 on the defen­
ce of the country, which was under the mark of war preparation, inciuded 
provisions for the cases of the omission of obiigation concerning miiitary 
service manifested in tbe breaches of the obiigations to register, to report 
and to appear. As far as the practicai consequences were concerned, this 
group of criminai offence was the most significant, it should aiso be menti­
oned. it was it) this Act that the criminai iiabitity of iegai persons appeared 
first it) Hungary. According to the Act. if it was a iegai person who had a 
iegai obiigation established by the Act or by a decree or a measure of an 
authority pursuant to the Act. the breach of which was dectarcd by a 
iegai provision to be a criminai offence, in the case of a criminai offence 
origination from the omission, that person was to be regarded as the per­
petrator who shouid have had taken the measure aimed at the perfor­
mance of the omitted obiigation. On the basis of this principie the res­
ponsibility of the iegai persons appeared exciusiveiy as individual iiabiiitv 
under criminai iaw.
After 1943 the deveiopment of Hungarian penai iaw was characterized 
by the fact that, in addition to the stiii vaiid PC of i878, a number of 
provisions of penai law were enacted which were in connection with the 
reorganization of the property relations, the system of economy ami the 
protection of the new conditions of economy, it was particuiariy in con­
nection with the intensified state eontroi over the economy that penai 
iaw made use of the means of the true crimes of omission. As eariv as 
in 1946 a statute was issued which. in connection with offences endangering
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the interests of public supply. that (¡ualified as a criminal offence the brc 
aches of obligations based on legislation on the obligatory production of 
products and produces and also the omisison of registering the stores of 
such products and produces. Provisions of a similar character could be 
found in the penal statutes of the years of the fifties issued in order to 
protect planned economy and planned foreign currency policy. It was in 
this period that a general obligation of reporting offences against the state 
and social property, the breach of which qualified as a criminal offence, 
appeared in Hungarian law.
From the sixties the number of true crimes of omission has not been 
growing any more, the penalization of acts of this character has even 
been pushed in the background. In the Penal Code of 1961 and in the Code 
of 1978, one may find only a few true crimes of omission among the pro­
visions protecting the relations of economy. A general obligation of repor­
ting criminal offences has not been prescribed by these Codes and even 
the misprision of specific criminal offences has been penalized in an ext 
remeley restricted area. Among the true crimes of omission in present 
practice we can find only certain definitions of offences which will be 
discussed in later parts.
From the outlined development concerning crimes of omission one 
may conclude that Hungarian penal law makes only a restricted use of 
the means of true crimes of omission. And from the point of view of legal 
policy the conclusion that can be drawn is that the true crimes of omission 
originate from certain social interests, primarily of the requirements 
of the protection of human life and bodily integrity or of the economy, 
and not from the requirements of the general control of society. The number 
of the offences belonging to this group is not likely to increase in the future.
1 n spite of the development in the realm of law, the rules of the General 
Part of the Codes that are relevant to our topic remained essentially 
the same during the last hundred years. The exception is the rule concer­
ning the result upgrading the offence, according to which (in both the ('ode 
of 1961 and of 1978) the graver consequences attached to the result as 
an upgrading circumstance may be applied only if the perpetrator was 
at least negligent as far as the result was concerned. Accordingly, if an 
offence by intention (e.g. intentional bodily injury) is upgraded by the 
result (e.g. death) for the upgrading result (for the death of the victim) 
the perpetrator is responsible on the condition that his negligence embraced 
this result (art. 15. of the P.C.). This provision is valid also for conduct 
of commission by omission and it is also valid for the upgrading result 
of offences by negligence.
We also have to note that for a long time the picture formed of ec/dc 
and (dder/u.s.sa//g .s*dc(had  been a simplified one.* cc/dc f*;d<v-
could be perpetrated exlusively through omission and 
they could not be regarded as offences of result f d?eyeAMHysde(?T*e^ ), whereas 
MMec/dc (7Kd'/'/c.s'.s'fOiy.sYMdde could be perpetrated equally by action and 
omission and they were necessarily offences of result f A'r/d/y.sdr/ddcT 
However, it has been realized that even offences that can be committed
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exclusively through omission may have result, according to the definition 
of the offence) such as the omission of providing care, or such upgraded 
varieties as fading to provide assistance resulting in someones death or 
the omission of providing maintenance resulting in grave privation. 
(And reversely, among criminal offences which can he committed equally 
through action and omission, there are some which do not have a result 
defined as the element of the definition of crime (e.g. criminal trespassing). 
And since the exact distinction of Hegehungsdelikte and Erfolgsdelikte 
within crimes of omission has significant consequences, the following 
classification is justified:
oj true crimes of omission as crimes by action fcc/he LbdfrluasMwys- 
dcl/lVc als Z?e<yc/iM?iysdcM'/e
!<) true crimes of omission as offences of result frc/he I/Mlerla-ssMwy.s- 
dcl?'№ als A7/oly. l^cll/,7cT'
c^ l not true (mixed) crimes of omission as crimes by action 
17H/c/Va.sA'M/!y.s'f/cb7./e also №ycAwwy,sdcM le
d 1^ not true (mixed) crimes of omission as offences of result fanec/de 
17?de7'lassMHysa'e?2№ als A7/aly.sY/cl//,7c/
II. The ontological structure of omission
1. According to the prevailing conception in Hungarian penal theory 
omission is not nothing in absolute sense but is not doing something, 
an inaction breaching a duty. The most general definition namely that 
omission is inaction which breaches a duty, through the devolution of 
the ancient principle of Impo&slln'llMTw walla csl oMlyallo, comprises, of 
course, the possibility of action, too: nobody may be obliged to do the 
impossible. However, in the Hungarian theory of penal law there exists 
another conception which regards the obligation to act and the possibility 
of action (in concreto for the person in the given situation) as separate 
criteria and professes that the ontological basis of omission is the possibility 
of action, its normative criterion is the obligation to act, consequently, 
omission is the unity of the ontological and the normative.
Since our task now is the ontological characterization of omission 
it is not superfluous to point out that from a certain point of view the 
role of norms prescribing obligations is determined ontologically: the 
existent may be declared to be non-existent and vice versa and they are 
not fit to derive the ontological nature of a phenomenon which has come 
into existence. It is a consequence of this recognition that the view which 
derives the causality of omission from undutifulness has not been favou­
rably evaluated by the Hungarian specialists of the theory of penal law 
as we shall discuss it later on, in the same way as Hungarian authors 
usually avoid the derivation of the distinction of action and omission 
from the prohibitive or imperative form of the norm. In reality the situ­
ation is the opposite, it is according to the active or passive ontological 
nature of the behaviour that we put the norm in the form of the gramma­
tical prohibitive or imperative.
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When we discuss the ontological structure of omission in the following 
parts, we study omission primarily as inaction not considering unduti­
fulness. However, prior to that, we have to point out in connection with 
undutifulness that while the action as a fact and its unlawfulness are clearly 
separate from a dogmatical point of view, the relation between unduti­
fulness necessary for the generation of omission and unlawfulness may 
be interpreted in different ways. Thus, in the literature of Hungarian civil 
law one can read the opinion, according to which omission as an undutiful 
inaction is unlawful by necessity. Among criminal lawyers it is the view 
that prevails according to which it is a different question that to the gene­
ration of omission mere undutifulness is necessary and it is again different 
whether there is also unlawfulness in the given situation or it is excluded.
2. Omission, the same way as action, is one of the forms of appearance 
of human behaviour. One of the consequences of keeping this fact in mind 
is that in the Hungarian theory of penal law there were not adherents of 
the conception that finds the relation of "A" and "non A" between action 
and omission — not being able to find a common criterion. Consequently, 
the argument of certain adherents of the theory of finality, according to 
which the connection between action and omission having the mentioned 
relationship may be created only by finality, could not have an impact.
That setting omission and action as the extreme opposite poles 
cannot reflect perfectly life either, can be seen from the fact that there 
occure more and more frequently criminal offences which are perpetrated 
through the fabric of moments of action and omission. It may be mere 
actual reality for example if someone causes an accident by not braking 
inspite of traffic regulations. Hut it also happens that some conduct is 
defined by the law in a way which presupposes the fabric of moments 
of action and omission. E.g. one of the varieties of perjury defined in the 
Code is that the perpetrator conceales elements of the truth when giving 
his testimony.
3. In Hungary various schools concerning the doctrines of conduct 
are known in connection with the interpretation of human conduct (such 
as the natural, causal, social schools and the school of finality). There 
is, however, a partially special school, too, according to which human 
conduct is characterized objectively by the capability of having an impact 
and subjectively by the per se volition (Willkurlichkeit), and in this sense 
human conduct independent from unlawfulness and culpability is the 
unity of objective and subjective moments.
The manifestation of the objective sphere of human behaviour i.e. 
of the capability of having an impact may be specific in the case of various 
offences of action and omission, inspite of that both action and omission 
may be related to the capability of having an impact. If this were denied, 
i.e. without interpreting both action and omission as forms of conduct ha­
ving equally the capability of inpact, the thesis according to which omission 
also violates or endangers the legal object (Rechtsgut) would not be con­
vincing either. Besides, on the basis of the outlined doctrine of conduct 
which finds the capability of having an impact as an objective charac-
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teristic of human conduct, the contrasting of the two forms of conduct 
in the absoiute sense is even less possible.
It is seif-evident that naming the capability of having an impact as 
the common trait of the two forms of conduct does not exclude at all that 
in the case of omission the capabiiity of having an impact shouid appear 
in a specific form. This capabiiity of omission exerts its influence indirectiy 
and usuaiiy one can it discover in the fact that it aiiows the a sociaiiv 
harmful situation to remain, allows a socially unfavourable process to 
continue. In a different approach, in the case of crimes of omission, the 
potential capability of the omitted conduct to have an impact simuld 
be considered, consequently it is evident that inaction may become an 
omission even depending on the other conditions, only to the extent as 
far as the omitted conduct would have had the capability of impact, 
i.e. would have been suitable to eliminate the socially harmful situation 
or to create a socially desirable advantage.
4. It follows írom the above that inaction may become capable of 
having an impact, consequently become omission only if the given person 
in the particular situation has the adequate possibility of action. While 
action (e.g. the planned administration of the poison with an intention 
of killing) after it is displayed frequently obtains an "independent life", 
the omission is more closely connected to the perpetrator and the capability 
of impact varies parallel with the possibility of action open for the concer­
ned person (including the possibility of averting the result in the relevant 
cases into the possibility of action). The previously mentioned ontological 
criterion of the concept of omission, i.e. the possibility of action conse­
quently, is definitive for the objective sphere of omission.
Although Hungarian literature never treated the possibility of action 
in full detail, recently the authors pay special attention to it. The common 
trait of their views is that they do not regard the lack of the possibility 
of action as a cause excluding the culpability of the omission but as a 
circumstance which excludes the omission itself.
The lack of the possibility of action may not benefit the person w ho 
eliminates this possibility through his own blamable action e.g. according 
to the consistent judicial practice, a person omitting providing maintenance 
may not be exculpated if he intentionally creates a situation where he is 
not able to perform his obligation. In such a situation similar to the actio 
libera in causa, the otherwise (i.e. withoug a blameworthy elimination) 
existing possibility of action is the ontological basis of omission.
5. One of the most interesting problems of the ontological study of 
omission is beyond doubt the issue of the causality of omission. We set 
out from the fact that the views of the theorists of Hungarian penal law 
are in agreement as far as they do not precondition their views by the 
existence or lack of undutifulness. The Hungarian legal development 
assisted the formation of such views. E.g. failing to provide assistance 
has been a criminal offence since 1948 and it is from that time of that 
providing assistance to injured persons or to persons whose life or bodily 
integrity is imperiled has been a legal obligation for everyone. However,
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we hardly could say that the upgraded variety of the offence of fading to 
provide assistance and causing death that way was not a form of conduct 
where the omission and death where in causa) retation and since 1948 it 
has changed. It is seif-evident that the causality of omission may be proved 
on!v if the causality of inaction, independent of undutifuiness, is atso 
proved.
A prominent representative of the theory of Hungarian civi) iaw 
developed a theory aitned at proving the causality of omission which 
is related the closest to the theory of interference. However, the theory 
was not accepted by the theorists of Hungarian penal law, the same way 
as other theories professing the causality of omission were not. On the 
grounds of the denial of the causality (at least with general validity) of 
omission essentially three conceptions can be enumerated:
c j In the case of omission the perpetrator is not responsible for causing 
the result but for not averting it.
A^) Omission is not causal in the sense of natural sciences, the lack 
of this type of causality is replaced by a "legal causality".
c) Omission may initiate or influence a causal process, thus may be 
causal on its own part if another person's behaviour depends on the beha­
viour of the omitting party. The causality of omission, of course, is not 
proven by that with general validity. In any other cases deferring form 
the mentioned one, the relation is not a causal one but only one related 
to causality, in other words, it is not an actual but merely a hypothetical 
causality that exists between omission and result.
We may mention as an interesting point that in the literature of 
Hungarian criminal law the issue of hypothetical causality first appeared 
in connection with the objective inevitability of the result and not in 
connection with omission. However, while in the case of the inevitability 
of the result (e.g. the death of the victim of the traffic accident would 
have inevitably occurcd even in the case of observing the traffic regula­
tions) hypothetical causality excludes responsibility for the result, in 
the case of offence of result by omission hypothetical causality lays the 
foundation of responsibility for the result.
While in principle one can form a judgement of certainty of actual 
causality, we have to be satisfied with a judgement of probability (even 
if it is a high probability) in connection with hypothetical causality, it 
is this fact that finds an expression in the provision of the Hungarian 
Penal Code, according to which death as a result may be consdidered as 
an upgrading circumstance in the case of failing to provide assistance if 
the assistance could have saved the life of the victim. To qualify the offence 
in this way it is not the certainty of avoiding the result of death that 
is necessary, but such a possibility.
6. In terms of time omission takes place at the moment of the gene­
ration of the obligation and possibility of action, i.e. together with those.
This mentioned principle is also valid in connection with offences 
of result by omission concerning the omission forming the conduct consti 
tuting the crime and consequences are also attributed to the moment of
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the omission (e.g. from the point of view of the validity of the law in 
terms of time this moment represents the time of perpetration). At the 
same time the offence of result committed by omission comes into exis­
tence in its completeness through a longer period of time and in all the 
cases when the completeness of all elements of the statutory definition 
of the offence has a significance, the time of the occurence of the result 
obtains a decisive role (e.g. in tbe case of offences of result the period of 
statutory limitation excluding punishability begins at that moment).
7. On the level of conduct independent of unlawfulness and guilt 
the subjective sphere of omission (the same way as of action) is to be found 
in tbe fact that the form of conduct is volitional (Willkürlichkeit). This 
willfulness usually is an actual one in the case of negligence accompained 
by inaction, however, it is only potential.
III. True crimes of omission
(Echte Cnterlassungsdelikte)
In the following part offences that can be committed only through 
omission will be considered as true crimes of omission independent of their 
having a result forming an element of the statutory definition.
1. As far as Jc/n/u proprm are concerned the condition of the perpet­
ration of a true offence of omission is the special obligation of the per- 
perator (the obligation to provide support or care) which is regulated 
by norms belonging to other branches of law and reflected de leye 
also by the Penal Code. Thus, the obligation of providing support is estab­
lished by an enforcable judicial decision based on the provisions of law or. 
the obligation of providing child support without the establishment of 
fatherhood by a final judicial decision of the court.
in the sphere of dc/m/u cow/nwnm, according to law, the precondition, 
of the perpetration of misprision is the reliable knowledge of tbe crime. 
Although the other relevant statutory definitions do not include such 
criteria, at least so much is evident that the prior knowledge is a precon­
dition also of concealing an exculpating circumstance.
2. As it has been mentioned, an omission is perpetrated at the moment 
when both the obligation of acting and the possibility of action are already 
]trésent. The fact, these two are not always the same is expressed also by 
the provisions of the Penal Code. Thus, in the narrow scope as far as mis- 
prission is penalized by tbe Hungarian code, it is also emphasized, in 
addition to obtaining a reliable knowledge, that it is the person who does 
not make his report to the authorities ms won ms Ac con that commits the 
offence.
As one may realize of the statutory definition of the failure of providing 
support the date when the payment of support is due and, accordingly, 
the perpetration of the true offence of omission may occur repeatedly 
from time to time. It is a different question that omissions committed 
before the judgement of the first instance court are not evaluated in 
Hungarian judicial practice as separate offences but as a single crime.
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By its own nature the true offence of resuit by omission is complete 
only if the resuit occured.
3. Different from the theory of finality, the Hungarian theory of 
penai iaw, is uniform to the extent that intention is treated within the 
sphere of cuipabiiity and that intention is not considered as an element 
of unlawfuiness (although the problem of intention in the case of a t­
tempt is not judged uniformly). At the same time, it is recognized that 
the objective dangerousness of the act to society (unlawfulness) may be 
influenced by certain elements of the subjective sphere of the statutory 
definition or, in other words, there are also subjective elements of unlaw­
fulness. Such characteristics may be recognized in certain types of pur­
pose, motives and, according to some authors, in the intention in the 
case of attempt. However, it is hardly relevant from the aspects of our 
topic since the statutory definitions of the true offences of omission in 
the Hungarian Penal Code do not include either purpose or motive and 
the significance of attempt is minor in this realm. The only thing which 
might require consideration is the following: since in the case of omission 
unlawfulness does not exist without a breach of obligation (but the re­
versed relation may occur), and the breach of obligation is sometimes 
actualized by obtaining the necessary knowledge, should it not be justi­
fied to consider this knowledge as a subjective element of unlawfulness?
4. According to Hungarian penal law, intention includes also the 
awareness of the socially dangerous nature (unlawfulness) of the act and 
if this awareness is lacking negligence may be established at most. Con­
cerning this criterion of intention it is naturally not the perpetrator's 
own evaluation that is significant but the fact whether the perpetrator 
is aware at the time of the comission of the act of cither the socially recog­
nized dangerousness of the act or its unlawfulness. For this reason, further 
on, because the awareness of the facts constituting the elements of the 
statutory definition convey usually the awareness of the dangerousness 
to society (unlawfulness) too, it occurs only exceptionally that intention 
may not be established only for the sole reason that the perpetrator has been 
in error concerning the act's dangerousness to society (its unlawfulness).
The structure of true offence of omission regulated in Hungarian 
penal law is of a nature which makes almost inconcievable that a perpet­
rator acting aware of his action constituting all the elements of the statu­
tory definition of the offence is not aware of the dangerousness to so cietyor 
unlawfulness. Consequently, it is only an artificial example that the person 
obligated to pay support is not aware of the fact that the obligee as the 
injured party withdraws his consent according to which the perpetrator 
does not have to pay for a certain period of time (this is a special variety 
of the presumed agreement of the victim to the crime). And even such 
cases can be considered as errors concerning the dangerousness to society 
instead of factual errors (which is separately regulated in the Hungarian 
Penal Code) only if undutifulness belonging to the concept of omission 
on the one hand and unlawfulness on the other hand are separated from 
each other in the sense of dogmatics.
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Л. Accordin': to Hungarian pena! ¡aw. true offences of omission can 
be committed oniy by intention, consequentiy negtigence has no practical 
significance in connection with them.
it is a different question that if some offence of omission is regulated 
in a way that the result constitutes an upgrading circumstance, it is enough 
that oniy the negiigence of the perpetrator concerns the resuit. This type 
of capability, however, is not different in terms of general principle, 
cither as far as the structure of mixed cuipahility or the nature of negli­
gence are concerned.
6. Jt is a general opinion in the Hungarian theory of pena) law that 
the attempt oi true offences oi omission, as Begchungsdelikte is concep- 
tuaiiv impossihie. For. as tong as the obiigation and the possibiiity of action 
are not existent there is no criminal offence at aii. on the other hand if 
they are persent. immediateiy a completed criminal offence is perpetrated. 
As far as the offences of resuit arc concerned, attempt is possihie in prin­
cipie (even if not in practice), nameiy the perpetrator's conduct constitutes 
the omission, but the result does not occur inspite of his intent.
Although attempt is possibie in the case of offences of resuit bv omis­
sion. differently from the crimes of action, their attempts may not be divi­
ded into phases (fuil and incomplete pitases). In connection with that 
there is a further characteristic, nameiy that abandoning the attempt 
through mere passivity is not possibie and the only possihie wav to desist 
voiuntariiy is to avert the resuit voluntariiy.
7. In the sphere of true offences of omission, culpability is estabiished 
according to the general principies. However, it shouid be undefined that 
aithongh expectabiiity (Zumutbarkeit) is not considered by aii Hungarian 
authors to be part of the concept of the criminat offence, as far as the 
nature of the speciai causes excluding punishabiiity in the case of true 
offences of omission is concerned, the opinion is uniform that the existence 
of these causes is justified by the lack of blameworthiness, more cioseiy 
by the iack of expectabiiity. ¡Such causes exciuding punishability are in 
the case of misprision family-relationship, in the case of keeping siicnt of 
an exculpating circumstance, if the witness would incriminate himself 
or a relation by telling the fact. And as far as the failure of providing assis­
tance is concerned, expectabiiity is an element of tin- definition of the offen­
ce.
IV. Crimes committed by omission
(*no'.rcd р/угигся q/* ow/.s'.s/'жу
"У Hungarian penal legislation has been characterized since 1878 
by the principie.s'ofaMlhf ??:гг7?исмз;ме/срс, мм/b/ я?ме /eye Midi;???;
rr?'w<m s dm r?dpu. From the point of view of the principie of iegality (nuilum 
crimen) the question arises: what shouid be incorporated in the disposition 
(corpus delicti)? Concerning materia] offences (Hrfoigsdeiikte) is it neces­
sary to characterize both the act and the resuit or is it enough to incor­
porate the result?
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Concerning crimes of omission it is generally the incorporation of 
the resuit and not that of the omission that is characteristic. However, 
it shouid he noted that in the case of material offences (including action 
or omission) the description of the act is rare (exceptionally occurs, e.g. 
with fraud and extortion); it is mostly the definition of the result that 
can be found in the disposition. Hut this type of regulation is not against 
the principle of legality.
By the definition of the result the legislator prohibits all the forms 
of behaviour that may be the causes of the result. As a rule, legal order 
is based on the foundations of ethics considering the result and not on 
one considering the intention, thus, in the final analysis, it is the result 
that puts the forms of conduct in a legally relavant unity ( The exception 
in criminal law is related to the attempt and to the formal offences.) 
It follows from this that omission becomes relavant to law through the 
occurence of the result.
The techniques of codification are the following:
1. The disposition defines only the result and through that all forms 
of action or omission are sanctioned which are the causes of the result 
(e.g. in the case of homicide, bodily injury).
2. The disposition describes the result but points out that it is caused 
by the violation of a provision included in a separate norm. This separate 
norm may be a rule of a profession —e.g. in the cases of endangerment 
committed through nagligence in ones profession and in the case of the 
results upgrading the former (P.f. art. 17).). Such a rule of profession 
is medical (eye ur//.s the rule concerning construction work and rules for 
preventing accidents, the rules concerning the handling of pharmaceutical 
products, etc A separate norm is the traffic code, from the point of 
view causing a traffic accident negligently and the results upgrading the 
offence (PC. art. 187.).
Finally, separate norms define certain rules of the economic activity 
in the realm of crimes of economy (crimes des affaires).
3. There is a special provision in the Hungarian Pena! Code which 
concerns the causation of a result through omission. According to that, 
a person who intentionally does not provide the assistance expectable 
of him to an injured person or to a person whose life or bodily integrity 
is directly imperiled (basic variety), shall be punished for failing to provide 
assistance; if the victim dies although his life could have been saved by 
providing assistance (upgraded variety), the perpetrator shall be more 
gravely punished (P.C. art. 172.). As we have seen in Ii/5., this case may 
be interpreted as hypothetical causality.
r^ ) Criminal law developed according to the models of crimes by in­
tention. crimes perpetrated through action and crimes of result. Crimes 
of negligence, crimes of omission and formal offences represent something 
different in relation to these models.
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It is not for nothing tinit the Congress of Hamburg discussed offences 
hy negligence and the present one discusses offences of omission, as one 
of their topics.
Material offences (both by intention and by negligence) committed 
through action are characterized as it follows:
— In case of intention the deed starts and ties the causal chain, 
the consequences do not range. Ontheotherhand, in case of negli­
gence the causal chain follows a random pattern because the syste­
matizing role of intention is missing.
— The obligation of avoiding the result gains significance in the 
sense that the causation of the result is prohibited by the law. 
This assertion expresses that it is the result that forms unlaw­
fulness.
— !'he possibility of action is open for the perpetrator, due precisely 
to the actual action.
Accordingly, the deed and the causal consequences produced bv it 
lay the foundation of a judgement of unlawfulness alone.
On the other hand, material offences (both by intention and by negli­
gence) committed through omission are characterized as it follows:
— Causality is not initiated by the perpetrator and it is not regulated 
by him. but the causal relation and the occurence of the result 
fall under the culpability (intention or negligence) of the perpet­
rator.
The breach of the obligation of avoiding the result is not simply 
a "judgement of unlawfulness" projected from the result to the 
deed, it is a breach of a special obligation to break the chain of 
causality —an obligation which has to be named, identified and 
proved. This special obligation is the oM/g'd/m; /o ar/.
— The possibility of action has to be proved separately, in the lack 
of such possibility it is not the expectability of the norm-observing 
form of behaviour (an issue of culpability) but the criminal act 
itself that is missing.
It follows from the comparison of deed and omission that it is not 
simply the obligation to avoid the result (or its breach) but the obligation 
to act (its breach) that gains significance as an issue of unlawfulness; 
further on the possibility to act is not a criterion of culpability belonging 
to the realm of the "Á'ŐHaea" but a criterion of unlawfulness. In the lack 
of the possibility to act there is no deed and there is no criminal offence: 
Os'/ oMiyfl/ioM.
(The obligation and the breach of obligation are not the elements 
only of criminal offences of omission. Action that breaches an obligation 
is also possible.)
The essence of mixed omission is:
— The omission of interrupting the causal relation leading to a result 
prohibited by penal law on condition
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— that the omission expresses the breach of the perpetrator's obli­
gation to act,
— the perpetrator has the possibitity to act;
— his culpabiiity (intention or negiigence) extends to the occurence 
of the resuit.
Considering that both action and omission may represent a breach 
of obiigation, the same act in the ontoiogica) sense may be regarded as 
an action and an omission at the same time. One may say that the perpet­
rator arriving to the city faiied to decrease ins speed or one may say that 
he was driving faster titan the speed iimit. However, action is a deed even 
in ontoiogicai sense, white omission is a deed oniy in the sense of axioiogy. 
For this reason, if it is possibie. it is preferable to use a qualification on 
the basis of action.
d C erta in  results are considered by criminal law as undesirable. 
Criminal law is directed against persons whose activity becomes the cause 
of such results. However, similar results may occur "by themselves" 
(heart attack) or they may be caused by the activity of third parties not 
examined in this relation (the driver causing the accident). The question 
is, who ore oMiyo/ed /o or/ (obligated to avoid the result) of those who recog­
nize the generation of the process of causalitv ?
Under our law the obligation of action is generated by:
1. Civil contract.
2. Labour-relation. In practice the obligation of action originating 
from a labour-relationship appears, as a rule, as the obligation to avert the 
damage threatening the property of the employer. The breach of the obli­
gation of acting in this sphere may lead to the perpetration of a crime aga­
inst property or a crime of economy if a result occurs.
3. The rules of a profession. According to art. 17!. of the P.C. a person 
who negligently exposes the life, hodily integrity or health of others through 
infringing the rule of his profession to direct danger or causes bodily 
injury commits a misdemeanour (basic variety); upgraded variety: the 
occurence of permanent phisical disability, death or the death of more 
than two persons. It is under this disposition that the physician is respon­
sible if he fails to send the patient to hospital (the result upgrading the offen­
ce is the death of the patient).
4. A general obligation to act (obligation to provide assistance) is 
created by art. 172. of the P.C. ,we have described that in item b/3. A driver 
is responsible for failing to provide assistance also in the case when he 
fails to provide the assistance expectable of him to the victim of a traffic 
accident caused by another person. As we have mentioned, if he victim 
dies but his life could have been saved by the assistance (upgraded variety), 
a mixed offence of omission is manifested. On the other hand, if a physician 
fails to provide assistance, it is not this offence but endagerment by neg­
ligence committed in someones profession (art. 171. of the P.C.) that is 
manifested.
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5. It has been a well-known idea in the literature for a long time that 
famiiy reiation or the ties of biood create an obligation to act. The ciassicai 
example is: a mother is obiigated to feed iter chiid. If she faiis to do so. 
she is responsibie for homicide, depending on the resuit.
In such cases our judicial practice establishes as a ruie the faiiure of 
providing assistance (art. 162. of P.C.). The defendant was found guilty 
of this crime in a case when the defendant's daughter gave birth to a child 
and she left the newborn in the field although the defendant objected 
that (the child survived.). It was the same in another case when the hus­
band left his wife who said she would commit suicide, alone in the apart 
ment, although she had earlier attempted suicide repeatedly. (The woman 
committed suicide and died.)
The scope of the obligation to act cannot be clarified in a general way. 
Although it is considered to be an element of unlawfulness, its contents 
are individual. The contents vary according to the relation between the 
perpetrator and the victim, by the occupation of the perpetrator, by the 
performance expectable of him on the basis of his intelligence and age. 
This obligation may be considered as generalized only in the case of an 
obligation originating from one's profession or labourrelationship.
The obligation to act has the broadest scope in the realm of failing to 
provide assistance, for this obligation burdens everyone. The limit is the 
"expectability" (of the person concerned), which is adjusted to the subjec­
tive abilities. Further on, it is preconditioned by the fact that the person 
injured in an accident needs tiie assistance. If the victim does not need 
assistance or other persons have already provided, that, the obligation 
to act ceases. The obligation of acting required here is derived by the lite­
rature from morals and from the rules of social coexistence.
Fulfilling the obligation of acting may mean in a particular case provi­
ding first aid to the injured person or may mean simply calling an ambu­
lance.
e) 77m in rrónóm/ hoc n/any-s'. consequently in the case
of action too. a social and not a natural category. If the physician makes 
a mistaken diagnosis and prescribes the medicine according to that and 
the relative administers this medicine to the patient, if the patient dies, 
the pathologist making an autopsy and looking for the cause of death 
following the laws of natural causality, cannot trace back the causes to 
the wrong diagnosis of the physician whereas the causality is plausible főt­
tbe judge.
Actual causality exists also with mixed crimes of omission but criminal 
law does not deal with that. Perhaps, front a different point of view, it 
is taken into consideration: the driver running over a person is punished 
on the basis of actual causality and the pedestrian who fails to provide 
assistance is punished on the basis of the causality of the omission.
/.s /Ac cuM3H/?/y o/*om/gs/oM c Aypo/Ac/mc/ mm? It is an axiological causa­
lity at any way in the sense at least that it is the value system of criminal 
law that divides the homogeneous reality into action and omission.
])i n n m  BÉKÉs, r m o n  n o K v A rn .  (;Éy.\ roKA-ft
Ttius, under the Hungarian Penal Code the basic variety of causing 
a traffic accident by negligence (art. 187. P.C.) is the causation of grave 
bodiiy injury, one of the resuits upgrading the offence is the death of the 
victim. In the iack of another disposition causaiity could be conceivable 
only according to this one even if the victim dies immediately or if he dies 
several hours later. However, there exists another disposition too, namely 
the failure to provide assistance (art. 172. of. P.C.). One of the upgraded 
varieties of this is the case when /Ac person icAo coicscr/ /Ac uccfJen/ fails 
to provide assistance. Another upgraded variety is when the victim dies 
but his life could have been saved by providing assistance. On the basis 
of the comparison of these two offences in Hungarian judicial practice 
it is examined, in case the victim does not die immediately and the defen­
dant has failed to provide assistance (joint conditions), whether the assis­
tance could have saved the life of the victim. If the answer is in the affir­
mative, causality is interpreted as it follows:
1. The traffic accident caused only grave bodily injury,
2. The perpetrator failed to provide the assistance expectable of him 
by which the life of the victim could have beend saved and owing 
to that omission the victim died.
8. Consequently, the perpetrator committed two offences and is 
responsible for two crimes.
1 nder item 11/5. we have already described the pervading Hungarian 
views concerning hypothetical causality. In this relation we underline 
that hypothetical causality is causality relavant to law; its scope might 
be extended or limited by positive law; it is an axiological category; its 
basis is the failure of preventing the occurence of the result and not the 
causation of it. Finally, we refer to the observation according to which 
the scope of hypothetical causality is not formed by the obligation of 
acting. Thus, the question concerning causality is, whether the assistance 
could have saved the victims life and it is only the second question who 
should have provided the assistance.
As far as intentional crimes committed by omission are concerned 
the consciousness has to extend to.
1. the possiblitv of the occurence of the result, further on to
2. the circumstance that the occurence of the result can be prevented.
The awareness of the obligation to act is not an element of intention
since it would mean the awareness of unlawfulness. The emotional sphere 
of intention (wish or acceptance) is connected to actual causality. A person 
who forsees the result and resigns himself to it but deems the occurence 
of the result to be unavoidable, is in an error in fact. If this arror has 
been caused by his negligence and the causation of the particular result 
is to be punished even in the case of he perpetrator's negligence, he is 
responsible for a criminal offence committed through negligence.
y/ In the case of conscious negligence (culpa consciente) the perpet­
rator is confident without foundations that the danger recognized by him 
would not be manifest (and for this reason he fails to act). In the case of
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unconscious negligence h is awareness does not extend to the possiblity 
of the result or tie is not aware of the fact that he couid avert the resutt 
by an action, and this unawareness is bahneworthy.
Under Hungarian penal iaw the person who faits to provide the assis­
tance cxpcctabie of turn is responsible for an offence by intention even if 
lie is only negligent as far as death (as an upgrading result) is concerned. 
This solution follows from the provision regulating the mixed form of 
culpability: art. 15. of M.U.
In principle is not excluded (the mother does not feed
her child but the child is still alive). Conceptually abandoning the attempt 
is excluded, instead the voluntary averting of the result may be considered. 
Under Hungarian penal law the person who voluntarily averts the occu­
rence of the result is not punishable for his attempted offence but should 
be punished for the so called "remaining offence.
V. Conduct of omission and participation
1 . Thc objective condition of being an actor is the obligation of 
acting and the possibility of acting. Hungarian judicial practice recognizes 
instigation to breach the obligation of action or it) the intensification of 
the intention of omission (abetting), namely in connection with failing 
to provide assistance.
Thus, the court found guilty the wife in instigation who made her 
husband drive on and not take the victim of an accident caused by another 
person. However, the practice tries to limit liability. If the car does not 
stop the passangcr who docs not express an opinion (or tells the driver to 
stop) is not a participant in the offence. If the car is stopped every passan- 
ger has to provide assistance according to the obligation of acting expec­
table of him. The breach of this obligation is punishable under the rules 
of being an actor and not a participant.
2. Liability for the conduct of a third party or for not preventing a 
criminal offence is exceptional under Hungarian criminal law.
A person entrusted with the management of social property is res­
ponsible for the emerging damage (both for fwc/'ycc.s oar/ Leva/a
CC3SUH&-) if he failed to perform his obligation of supervision and made 
possible for another person the causation of the damage through that. 
It is an offence by negligence (art 32b. I'.U.) It is under this provision that 
the head of the financial department of an enterprise is responsible if he 
fails to supervise the cashier and the cashier had the chance through that 
to commit embezzlement.
The physician may be liable for negligent endagerment committed 
in his profession (art 171. !'.('.) if he failed to perform random checking 
and the nurse caused the death of a patient through negligence by breac­
hing instructions.
The court found a husband guilty in passive abettment because of 
his failure to prevent the criminal offence, since he let her sister in law 
living in his household kill his wife in his presence, although he verbally
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opposed the perpetration. It is passive abettment that the courts estabiish 
in aii the cases where it is preciseiy the prevention of theft and other simi­
tar offences that is the obtigation of the perpetrator originating from his 
position and tie toterates the commission of the intentional offence brea­
ching his obtigation.
3. In Hungary tegat persons are usuatty state institutions, state enter­
prises and cooperatives and associations (e.g. sport ciubs) betonging atso 
to the socialist sector. According to ttie general opinion, tegat persons have 
no criminat responsibitity. If a criminal offence is committed through 
the operation of the tegat person it is not the head (manager, director, 
president) who is responsible but ttie perpetrator himself who e.g. faited 
in his duty of supervision.
At present in Hungary the operation of so catted civit taw com [tallies 
in the sphere of economy is attowed. These companies, however, are not 
legat entities. The partners forming ttie civit taw company are responsibte 
for the operation of the business venture even with their persona! pro­
perty. Ttie practice concerning ttie criminat tiabitity of these companies 
is not formed yet by ttie courts.
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D IE  UXTERLASSUNGSDELIKTE UN!) DIE VERANTW ORTLICHKEIT FÜ R  DIE
UNTERLASSUNG
(Zusam m enfassung)
I. Die f7?tirrsttrAtttty tier Dutcr/if-tsutty und t'Arrr ttlru/rrcAdtcAen F'unA'ttou
]. Die E ntw ick lung  de r B edeu tung  de r U nterlassung  im n a tionalen  S traft echt 
o ) E ch te  U nterlassungsdeiik te  
A) U nechte U n terlassungsdelik te
c) Die T eitnahm e bei de r U n te tlassung  u n d  die V eran tw o rtb ch k eit fü r die 
H an d h m g  a n d ere r
2. Die D'nterAuMuny und  ¡Are Bezt'eAuny zur utrlse/ta/t/icAen u n d  yciedsc/ut/dt'cAert 
A 'tru ltur und  zum nationa/en  IfecAt
ü) D as S tra frech t als M itte l de r K rim in a lp o litik
AJ Die K rite rien  de r K ritu in a lp o litik  in H insich t a u f  die Z ielsetzungen u n d  
F unk tio n en  des S tra frech ts
c) Die G renzen des s tra frech tlich en  In te rv en tio n  d u rc h  den  S ta a t
II . Die /S'frttA'fttr der i/ufer(a.s.suny ("on/oloyisc/te -T.s/<eAtr)
а )  Die U n te tla ssu n g  au s  dem  n a tu ra lis tisch en  A spekt;
б) Die U ntet lassung als B eziehung
cj U 'nteriassung und  K a u sa litä t
d ) U n te rlassu n g  und die Z eit
e) S u b jek tiv e  G esich tspunk te  der U nterlassung
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! ! I. /h*ccc/?/cu f77?/cr/us.^u/?y.sd^/!'A'/c
Hic Stíuktm * de!* ech ten  1 n terlassu n g sd clik te  
Die B edingungen de r f 'n te rla ssu n g sh an d lu n g  
Die zeitlichen B edingungen
r j  De! V orsatz, d as bew usstseiït und die R echtsw idt igkeit 
Die Fahrlässigkeit, v o r allem  die unbew usste  Fahrlässigkeit 
Versuch und  de r Bück! itt 
/ J  Die Schuld
IV. f/yiccA/e fl!/cr/u.-i.?u7%f.-ide/;A*/c
Die S t!n k tu r  de r unech ten  1 n terlassungsdclik le  
u^ Das prinzip  de r legalität und die S tra fb a ik e it 
^  X o ü n a tiv e  M ethoden
c^ Die not wendigen B edingungen zur gem einsam en R egelung der 1 nterlassungs- 
und H andlungsdelik te  (AHge:neiner und Besondere! Teil) 
d^ Die P flich t ztun H andeln  
cj Die „Kausalität** de r 1 n terlassu n g  
Der V orsatz 
Die Fahrlässigkeit 
Ve!S!tch und R ü c k tr itt  
Die Schuld
V. Dü? t/7?/cr/u.MU7/y und die 7'ci/nuAyne
1. Die P roblem e der T eilnalnne bei den t n terlassungsdelik ten
2. Die allgem einen Problem e d e r T eilnahm e
V erantw o! tlichkeit für die F ahrlässigkeit an d ere r 
\e ra n tw o rt! ie h k e it fü r das X ich tverh indern  von S tra f ta te n
3. Die V eran tw ortlichkeit de r ju ris tisch en  Personen
INFRACTIONS D'OMISSION HT RKSI'ONDABILITÉ i'ÉNALK POUR OMISSION
IV! B F B É K É S , professeur chargé  de cours 
T IB O R  H O R V Á TH  professeur 
U KZ A T O K A !!, professeur cha!gé  de cours
( Résum é)
1. Au t'cri/a*oOou du ru/c or/ucdc/uc/U ^oué p u r /c^ cu7?d!?dcs o/ui-s.-drc# ci de /u /unc/io?! 
du  dru?/ penn/
1. Sythése (histot iíjue) de 1 évo lu tion  ilu rôle joue p a r  le phénom ène de 1 omission 
dans le d ro it pénal, n a tio n a l, no tam m en t p a r  rap p o rt:
<0 aux  in frac tions d om ission (progrem ent d ites: ech te  t n terlassungsdelik te), 
aux in fractions de comission p a r  om ission (unechte  l 'n te rlassungsde lik te). 
r j  a la p a rtic ip a tio n  dans l'om ission et responsab ilité  f in a le  du  fait d 'a u tru i
Les liens e n tre  le rôle des condu ites om issivc et la s tru c tu re  socio-éconim ique 
et ju rid iq u e  nationale:
u j la d é te rm ination  d 'ob liga tions d 'a g ir  punies pat le droit pénal com m e m oyen 
de polit ique C! im inalle;
les c ritères de ce tte  po litique  p a r  rap p o rt a la fonction et aux  b u ts  du droit 
pénal national;
c ; les lim ites de l 'in te rv en tio n  de l 'K ta t en m atière  pénale.
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11. /ar structure (te /u cnrututte ourrssrce (^ tes asyrects orrtotoyryues^
u) L 'om ission d 'u n  po in t de vue n a tu ra lis te ;
l'om ission en ta n t  que concept de ra la tio n ;
f )  om ission e t causalité ;
</) om ission e t tem ps;
aspects sub jectifs  de  la co ndu ite  om issivc.
[ i l .  /tr/ructfou.! d'ourt'.s.stou épropreurcut (Mes/ ec/rte f/uter/ussurrysdc/tAtc)
La s tru c tu re  des in frac tions d 'om ission (p roprem en t d ites) 
e t  ses problèm es, no tam m en t pa t rap p o rt 
a^ atrx conditions de la  co ndu ite  om issive; 
é )  aux  conditions tetrtpotelles (attssi en re la tio n  avec e t) f);
<") au  dol, a la conscience et a  l 'an tiju rid ie ité ;
a  ta fau te , e t  particu lièrem en t la fau te  inconsciente; 
e j a  la te n ta tiv e , le désistem ent;
/ J  a  la  cu lpab ilité .
IV . M /rra-M ais (te coara; i.s'.si'oa parourr.s.frorr (*uuec/rte teutertassUMyscte/R-te^
L a s tru c tu re  des in frac tions de com m ission par om ission e t ses problèm es, n o !an i­
m ent p a r  rappor t :
au  respect d u  principe  de légalité  d an s  le p u n issab iü té  des in frac tions de 
com m ission p a r  omission; 
aux  techn iques norm atives;
c) aux  conditions nécessaires a 1 assim ila tion  des in frac tions d om ission aux 
in frac tions de  com m ission (par tie  générale  e t par tie  spéciale);
^  a l'ob liga tion  d 'em pecher le ré su lta t de  l 'in frac tio n  e t a l'o b lig a tio n  d 'em pecher 
l'in frac tio n ; le fondem ent de l'ob liga tion  d 'ag ir; 
e j a la p ré ten d u e  "cau sa lité "  om issive;
a u  do); 
yJ a  la fau te ;
A) a  la te n ta tiv e  et art désistem ent;
() a lrr cu lp ab ilité  e t a 1 équivalence en tre  actiorr et om ission.
V. Corufurte OMttsstre et pnrttc tpattou
1. Les p roblèm es de la  p a rtic ip a tio n  dans l 'in frac tio n  d 'om ission.
2. Les problèm es généraux  de ht par tic ipation  per omtA'sr'ouenr 
" J  (Vo ) R esponsab ilité  du  fa it d 'a u tru i;
N  R esponsab ilité  p o u r ne pas av o ir cm peche une in frac tion ; lim ites au  con­
sen tem en t.
3. L tt responsab ilité  p o u r om ission a l 'in te rie u r des sociétés, des gr oupem ents e t 
des sociétés com plexes. R e la tions avec le problèm e do la responsab ilité  penale 
des personnes m orales.
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